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Exploring the Psychological Basis for Transitions in the Archaeological Record 
 
Introduction 
No other species remotely approaches the human capacity for the cultural evolution of novelty 
that is accumulative, adaptive, and open-ended (i.e., with no a priori limit on the size or scope 
of possibilities). By culture we mean extrasomatic adaptations—including behavior and 
technology—that are socially rather than sexually transmitted. This chapter synthesizes 
research from anthropology, psychology, archaeology, and agent-based modeling into a 
speculative yet coherent account of two fundamental cognitive transitions underlying human 
cultural evolution that is consistent with contemporary psychology. While the chapter 
overlaps with a more technical paper on this topic (Gabora & Smith 2018), it incorporates 
new research and elaborates a genetic component to our overall argument. The ideas in this 
chapter grew out of a non-Darwinian framework for cultural evolution, referred to as the Self-
other Reorganization (SOR) theory of cultural evolution (Gabora, 2013, in press; Smith, 
2013), which was inspired by research on the origin and earliest stage in the evolution of life 
(Cornish-Bowden & Cárdenas 2017; Goldenfeld, Biancalani, & Jafarpour, 2017, Vetsigian, 
Woese, & Goldenfeld 2006; Woese, 2002). SOR bridges psychological research on 
fundamental aspects of our human nature such as creativity and our proclivity to reflect on 
ideas from different perspectives, with the literature on evolutionary approaches to cultural 
evolution that aspire to synthesize the behavioral sciences much as has been done for the 
biological scientists. The current chapter is complementary to this effort, but less abstract; it 
attempts to ground the theory of cultural evolution in terms of cognitive transitions as 
suggested by archaeological evidence.  
By the term archaeological evidence we mean the ‘material correlates’ or 
‘precipitates’ of behavior. While artifacts were once treated as indicators of ‘progress’, more 
contemporary approaches, including the approach taken here, seek to reveal the cognitive 
conditions responsible for artifacts (and other material precipitates of behavior; Haidle, 2009, 
Wragg-Sykes, 2015). Note that although our theoretical approach is founded on evolutionary 
principles, it is not what is often referred to as ‘evolutionary psychology’ (Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1992; Sell et al, 2009) which focuses on biological underpinnings of cultural evolution 
as opposed to the impact of culture as an evolutionary process unto itself. Our approach is 
more aligned to other evolutionary approaches to the general question of how modern 
cognition arose, such as those of Wynn and Coolidge (e.g., Wynn et al, 2017) highlighting 
developmental psychology and Bruner (e.g. 2010), highlighting palaeoneurology. 
Our use of the term ‘transition’ in the title is intensional (for as Straus, 2009, observes 
the term ‘transition’ is sometimes used too casually). We begin the chapter with a discussion 
of the concept of evolutionary transition, for the ‘unpacking’ of this term could be of 
explanatory value with respect to archaeological change and its cognitive underpinnings. 
 
Evolutionary Transitions 
Transitions are common in evolution (Szathmary & Maynard Smith, 1995). Nonlinear 
interactions between different information levels (e.g., genotype, phenotype, environment, 
and even developmental characteristics) often give rise to emergent outcomes that generate 
discontinuities (Galis & Metz, 2007). Research into the mechanisms underlying evolutionary 
transitions have made headway into explaining the origins of new varieties of information 
organization and unpacking terms such ‘adaptation due to natural selection’, aiming “to 
analyze trends of increasing complexity” (Griesmer, 2000). Szathmary and Maynard-Smith’s 
account of the eight major transitions in the history of life remains widely accepted today 
(Szathmary 2015, Calcott & Sterelny, 2011), with other transitions continue to be identified, 
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including the evolution of new sexes (Parker, 2004), and new varieties of ant agriculture 
(Schultz & Brady, 2008), animal individuality (Godfrey-Smith 2011), metabolism and cell 
structure (DeLong et al., 2010), technology (Geels, 2002) and hominin socialization (Foley & 
Gamble 2009). 
Research on the dynamics (e.g., rates and types) of evolutionary transitions shows that 
despite their diversity they exhibit common features: they are (1) rare, (2) involve new levels 
of organization of information, (3) followed by diversification, and (4) incomplete (Wilson 
2010). Szathmary and Maynard-Smith include the transition from “primate societies to human 
societies ” as part of their “Extended Evolutionary Synthesis” (Wilson, 2010), but this 
synthesis was formulated just prior to the rise of explicitly evolutionary approaches to modern 
cognition. 
We suggest that the theory of evolutionary transitions can provide a useful framework 
for understanding the cognitive changes culminating in behavioral modernity (BM). In 
cognitive evolution, evidence of significant change might be stretched out over time and 
space for many reasons, such as lag between initial appearance and demic diffusion, 
ambiguities in the archaeological and fossil records. In this chapter we explore two such 
transitions. The first is the origin of a richer, post-Pan, post-Australopithecine culture as early 
as 2.2 million years ago (Harmand et al., 2015). The second is the explosion of creative 
culture in the Middle/Upper Paleolithic. 
 
Origin of Post-Pan, Post-Australopithecine Culture: A First Cognitive Transition 
Archaeological and Anthropological Evidence 
The minds of Australopithecus and earliest Homo appear to have been anchored to the present 
moment of concrete sensory perceptions, i.e., the “here and now”. Simple stone (and some 
bone and antler) implements indicates that they encoded perceptions of events in memory, 
thereby supplying “timely information to the organism’s decision-making systems” (Klein et 
al., 2002, page 306)—but had little voluntary access to memories without external cues. The 
upshot was minimal innovation and artifact variation. 
This is evident in the early archaeological record, beginning with stone tools from 
Lomekwi 3 West Turkana, Kenya, 3.3 mya (Harmand et al., 2015), and characterized by 
opportunism in highly restricted environments (Braun et al., 2008). Tools were 
technologically on par with those of modern chimpanzees (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Blackwell 
& d’Errico, 2001; see Read [2008] and Fuentes [2015] for cognitive considerations of 
chimpanzee toolmaking). These tools lack evidence of symbolism (d’Errico et al., 2003), and 
were transported relatively short distances across landscapes (Potts, 2012). While nut-
cracking and other simple tool use outside Homo may involve sequential chaining of actions, 
(and thus sequential chaining of the mental representations underlying these actions), outside 
Homo, sequential processing did not occur reliably enough to cross the threshold for abstract 
thought (see Gabora & Steel, 2017 for a mathematical model of this). Thus, it appears that 
early Homo could not invent or refine complex actions, gestures, or vocalizations, and their 
ability to voluntarily shape, modify, or practice skills and actions was at best minimal. 
Early Homo evolved into several forms, including H. erectus, dating between 2.8 - 0.3 
million years ago (Villmoare et al., 2015), and there was a shift away from biology and 
towards culture as the primary means of adaption in this lineage, attended by significant 
cultural elaboration. Having expanded out from Africa as early as 2 mya, Homo constructed 
tools involving more production steps and more varied raw materials (Haidle, 2009), imposed 
symmetry on tool stone (Lepre et al., 2011), used and controlled fire (Goren-Inbar et al., 
2004), crossed stretches of open water up to 20 km (Gibbons 1998), ranged as far north as 
latitude 52◦ (Preece et al., 2010), revisited campsites possibly for seasons at a time, built 
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shelters (Mania & Mania 2005), transported tool stone over greater distances than their 
predecessors (Moutsou, 2014), and ranked moderately high among predators (Plummer, 
2004). While the cranial capacity of Homo erectus was approximately 1,000 cc—about 25% 
larger than that of Homo habilis, at least twice as large as that of living great apes, and 75% 
that of modern humans (Aiello, 1996)—brain volume alone cannot explain these 
developments. It is widely thought that these signs of a culture richer than that of Pan or 
Australopithecus c. 1.7 mya reflect a significant transition in cognitive and/or social 
characteristics. 
 
Early Ideas about What Caused this First Transition 
We can take as a starting point Donald’s (1991) theory of cognitive evolution as it was a 
breakthrough that paved the way for much of what followed. Because the cognition of Homo 
habilis was primarily restricted to whatever episode one was currently experience, Donald 
refers to it as an episodic mode of cognition. He proposed that the enlarged cranial capacity 
brought about the onset of what he calls a self-triggered recall and rehearsal loop, which we 
abbreviate STR. STR enabled hominins to voluntarily retrieve stored memories independent 
of environmental cues (sometimes referred to as ‘autocuing’) and engage in representational 
redescription and the refinement of thoughts and ideas. This was a fundamentally new mode 
of cognitive functioning which Donald referred to as the mimetic mind because it could 
‘mime’ or act out past or possible future events, thereby not only temporarily escaping the 
present, and communicating that escape to others. 
STR also enabled attention to be directed away from the outside world toward ones’ 
internal representations, paving the way for abstract thought. We use the term abstract 
thought to refer to the reprocessing of previous experiences, as in counterfactual thinking, 
planning, or creativity, as opposed to direct perception of the ‘here and now’ (for a review of 
abstract thought, see Barsalou, 2005). Note that in much of the cultural evolution literature, 
abstract thought and creativity, if mentioned at all, are equated with individual learning, 
which is thought to mean ‘learning for oneself’ (e.g., Henrich & Boyd, 2002; Mesoudi, 
Whiten & Laland, 2006; Rogers, 1988). However, they are not the same thing; individual 
learning deals with obtaining pre-existing information from the environment through non-
social means (e.g., learning to differentiate different kinds of trees). The information does not 
change form just because the individual now knows it. In contrast, abstract thought involves 
the reprocessing of  internally sourced mental contents, such that they are in flux, and when 
this results in the generation of useful or pleasing ideas, behavior, or artifacts that did not 
previously exist, it is said to be creative. Indeed, there is increasing recognition of the extent 
to which creative outcomes are contingent upon internally driven incremental/iterative honing 
or reprocessing (Basadur, 1995; Chan & Schunn, 2015; Feinstein, 2006; Gabora, 2017). 
Note that Donald’s explanation focuses on neither technical nor social abilities but on 
a cognitive ability that facilitated both. STR enabled systematic evaluation and improvement 
of thoughts and motor skills such that they could be adapted to new situations, resulting in 
voluntary rehearsal and refinement of actions and artifacts. STR also broadened the scope of 
social activities to include re-enactive play and pantomime. 
 
Proposed Theory of Cognitive Underpinnings of this First Transition 
Leaving aside alternatives to Donald’s proposal until the end of this section, we note for now 
that although Donald’s theory seems reasonable, it does not explain why larger brain size 
enabled STR. In what follows, we contextualize Donald’s (1991) schema in research on the 
nature of associative memory. We will ground the concept of STR in a neural level account of 
the mechanisms underlying cognitive flexibility and creativity (Gabora, 2010; Gabora & 
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Ranjan, 2013). 
We start by summarizing a few well-known features of associative memory. Each 
neuron is sensitive to a primitive stimulus attribute, or microfeature, such as lines of a 
particular orientation, or sounds of a particular pitch. Items in memory are distributed across 
cell assemblies of such neurons; thus each neuron participates in the encoding of many items. 
Memory is also content-addressable: there is a systematic relationship between the content of 
an item and the neurons that encode it; therefore, items that share microfeatures may be 
encoded in overlapping distributions of neurons. 
While in and of itself increased brain volume cannot explain the origin of BM, we 
suggest that larger brains enabled a transition from coarse-grained to more fine-grained 
memory. The smaller the number of neurons a brain has to work with, the fewer attributes of 
any given memory item it can encode, and the less able it is to forge associations on the basis 
of shared attributes. Conversely, the evolution of finer-grained memory meant that memory 
items could be encoded in more detail, i.e., distributed across larger sets of cell assemblies 
containing more neurons. Since memory organization was content addressable, this meant 
more ways in which distributed representations could meaningfully overlap, and greater 
overlap enabled more routes by which one memory could evoke another. 
This in turn made possible the onset of STR, and paved the way for the capacity to 
engage in recursive recall and streams of abstract thought, and a limited form of insight 
(Gabora, 2002, 2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013). As a simple example, the reason that the 
experience of seeing a leaf floating on a lake could potentially play a role in the invention of a 
raft is that both experiences involve overlap in the set of relevant attribute “float on water”, 
and thus overlap of activated cell assemblies. 
Items in memorys could now be reprocessed until they achieved a form that was 
acceptably consistent with existing understandings or sufficiently enabled goals and desires to 
be achieved (Gabora, 1999. This scenario provides a plausible neural-level account of 
Donald’s (1991) proposal that abstract thought was a natural consequence of possessing a 
self-triggered recall and rehearsal loop, made possible by an increase in brain size. 
 
Comparison with Other Theories 
Mithen’s (1996) model features the accumulation and overlap of different intelligence 
modules. Although in its details his model runs rather counter to much current thinking 
including our own, his thoughts on cognitive fluidity and creativity influenced the model 
proposed here. 
Some theories attribute this transition to social factors. Foley and Gamble (2009) 
emphasize enhanced family bonding and the capacity for a more focused style of 
concentration, further enhanced by controlled use of fire by at least 400,000 years ago. 
Wiessner (2014) suggested that fire not only enabled the preparation of healthier food, but by 
providing light after dark, facilitated playful and imaginative social bonding. Others 
emphasize an extrication from biologically based to culturally based kinship networks (Leaf 
& Read, 2012; Read, Lane & van der Leeuw, 2015). We believe that these social explanations 
are correct but that they have their origin in cognitive changes, which altered not only social 
interactions but interactions with other aspects of human experience as well. 
Our proposal bears some resemblance to Hauser et al.’s (2002) suggestion that the 
capacity for recursion is what distinguishes human cognition from that of other species, Penn 
et al’s (2008) concept of relational reinterpretation, and Read’s (2009) claim that recursive 
reasoning with relational concepts made possible a conceptually based system of social 
relations but may have evolved alongside non-social activities such as toolmaking. However, 
our proposal goes further, because it grounds the onset of recursive reasoning in a specific 
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cognitive transition. While Read suggests that recursive reasoning was made possible by 
larger working memory, we argue that larger working memory in and of itself is not useful; it 
must goes hand-in-hand with—and indeed is a natural byproduct of—a finer-grained memory. 
As an illustrative example, let us suppose that a hominid with a coarse-grained memory 
increased its working memory from being able to think only of one thing at a time (e.g., a 
leaf) to two (e.g., a leaf and the moon). This would generally be a source of confusion. 
However, if it held only one thing in mind at a time but encoded it in richer detail (e.g., 
incorporating attributes of a leaf such as ‘thin’, ‘flat’, and so forth), it could forge meaningful 
associations with other items based on these attributes (e.g., other thin, flat things). 
Our proposal also bears some similarity to Chomsky’s (2008) suggestion that this 
transition reflects the onset of the capacity for a ‘merge’ operation. ‘Merge’ is described as 
the forging of associations based on their global similarity, i.e., between items that are highly 
similar or that co-occur in space or time. In contrast, for STR the memory must be sufficiently 
fine-grained (i.e., items must be encoded in sufficient detail) that the associative process can 
operate on the basis of specific attributes to which specific neurons are tuned. STR can forge 
associations between items that are related by as few as a single attribute, and do so 
recursively such that the output of one such operation is the input for the next, and reliably, 
such that encodings are modified in light of each other in the course of streams of thought 
(Gabora, 2002, 2013, 2017; detailed examples, such as the invention of a fence made of skis 
on the basis of the attributes ‘tall’, ‘skinny’ and ‘sturdy’ [Gabora, 2010], and the generation of 
the idea of a beanbag chair on the basis of the single attribute ‘conforms to shape’ [Gabora, 
2018], are provided elsewhere). Thus our proposal (but not ‘merge’) offers a causal link 
between brain size and cognitive ability, i.e., more neurons means they can be tuned to a 
broader range of attributes and thereby form more associations on the basis of shared 
attributes. 
 
Creative Culture in Middle/Upper Paleolithic: A Second Cognitive Transition 
Archaeological and Anthropological Evidence 
The African archaeological record indicates another significant cultural transition 
approximately 100,000 years ago that shows many material correlates of BM. Though there is 
no single definitive indicator of BM (d’Errico et al., 2005; Shea 2011), it is generally thought 
to involve (a) a radical proliferation of tool types that better fit tools to specific tasks 
(McBrearty & Brooks, 2000), (b) elaborate burial sites indicating ritual (Hovers, Ilani, Bar-
Yosef, & Vandermeersch, 2003) and possibly religion (Rappaport, 1999), (c) artifacts 
indicating personal symbolic ornamentation (d’Errico et al., 2009), (d) ‘cave art’, i.e., 
representational imagery featuring depictions of animals (Pike et al., 2012) and human beings 
(Nelson, 2008), (e) complex hearths and highly structured use of living spaces (Otte, 2012), 
(f) calorie-gathering intensification that included widespread use of aquatic resources 
(Erlandson, 2001), and (g) extensive use of bone and antler tools, sometimes with engraved 
designs. BM extended across Africa after 100,000 years ago, and was present in Sub-
Himalayan Asia and Australasia over 50,000 years ago (Mulvaney & Kamminga, 1999) and 
Continental Europe thereafter (Mellars, 2006).  
It is uncertain whether this archaeological record reflects a genuine transition resulting 
in BM because claims to this effect are based on the European Paleolithic record, and largely 
exclude the lesser-known African record (Fisher & Ridley, 2013). Artifacts associated with a 
rapid transition to BM 40,000-50,000 years ago in Europe are found in the African Middle 
Stone Age tens of thousands of years earlier, pushing the cultural transition more closely into 
alignment with the transition to anatomical modernity between 200,000 and 100,000 BP. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that BM appeared in Africa between 100,000 to 50,000 years ago, 
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and spread to Europe, resulting in displacement of the Neanderthals (Fisher & Ridley, 2013). 
Despite an overall lack of increase in cranial capacity, the prefrontal cortex, and more 
particularly the orbitofrontal region, increased significantly in size (Dunbar 1993), in what 
was likely a time of major neural reorganization (Morgan 2013).  Homo sapiens could now 
effectively archive information, and adapt it to different needs and circumstances, making 
their cultures radically more creative, open-ended, and accumulative than any prior hominin 
(Mithen, 1998).  
This transition is also commonly associated with the origins of complex language. 
Although the ambiguity of the archaeological evidence makes it difficult to know exactly 
when language began (Davidson & Noble 1989; Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Hauser, 
Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002), it is widely believed—based on stone tool symmetry and 
complexity of manufacture—that as long ago as c. 1.7 million years Homo used gestural and 
prelinguistic vocalization communications that would have shared some organizational 
similarities with modern humans insofar as they differed significantly from other primate 
communications. The evolution of grammatically- and syntactically-modern language is 
generally placed (depending on whether one is observing it in Africa, sub-Himalayan Asia or 
Western Eurasia) after about 100,000 years ago, around the start of the Upper Palaeolithic 
(Bickerton, 2014; Dunbar, 1993; Tomasello, 1999). 
 
Proposed Cognitive Mechanism Underlying Second Transition 
We propose that the root cause of the cultural explosion of the Middle/Upper Paleolithic was 
a fine-tuning of the biochemical mechanisms underlying the capacity to spontaneously shift 
between different modes of thought in response to the situation, and that this is accomplished 
by varying the specificity of the activated region of memory. The ability to shift between 
different modes is referred to as contextual focus (CF) because it requires the capacity to 
focus or defocus attention in response to contextual factors (Gabora, 2003), such as a specific 
a goal, a particular audience, or aspect of the situation, and do so continuously throughout a 
task. Focused attention is conducive to analytical thought (Agnoli, Franchin, Rubaltelli, & 
Corazza, 2015; Vartanian, 2009; Zabelina, 2018), wherein activation of memory is 
constrained enough to hone in and mentally operate on only the relevant aspects of mental 
contents. In contrast, by diffusely activating a wide region of memory, defocused attention is 
conducive to associative thought; it enables more obscure (though potentially relevant) 
aspects of the situation to be considered. This greatly enhances the potential for insight, i.e., 
the forging of obscure but useful or relevant connections. 
Note that associative thought is useful for breaking out of a rut, but would be risky 
without the ability to reign it back in; basic survival related tasks may be impeded if 
everything is reminding you of everything else. Therefore, it would take considerable time to 
fine-tune the mechanisms underlying the capacity to spontaneously shift between these two 
processing modes such that one retained the benefits of escaping local minima without 
running the risk of being perpetually side-tracked. The time needed to fine-tune this could 
potentially be the explanation for the lag between anatomical and BM. 
Once the products of one mode of thought could become ‘ingredients’ for the other, 
hominids could reflect on thoughts and ideas not just from different perspectives but at 
different levels of granularity, from basic level concepts (e.g., rabbit) up to abstract concepts 
(e.g., animal) and down to more detailed levels (e.g., legs), as well as conceive of their 
interrelationships. This kind of personal reflection was necessary for, and indeed a precursor 
to, the need to come up with names for these things, i.e., the development of complex 
languages. Thus, it is proposed that CF paved the way for not just language but the seemingly 
diverse collection of cognitive abilities considered diagnostic of BM.  
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To see how the onset of CF could result in open-ended cultural complexity, recall that 
associative memory has the following properties: distributed representation, coarse coding, 
and content addressability. Each thought may activate more or fewer cell assemblies 
depending on the nature of the task. Focused attention is conducive to analytic thought 
because memory activation is constrained enough to zero in and operate on key defining 
properties. Defocused attention, by diffusely activating a broader region of memory, is 
conducive to associative thought; obscure (but potentially relevant) aspects of the situation 
come into play (Gabora, 2000, 2010). Thus, thinking of, say, the concept SUN in an analytic 
mode might bring to mind only the literal sun, in an associative mode of thought it might also 
bring to mind other sources of heat, or other stars, or even someone with a sunny disposition. 
Once our hominid ancestors could shift between these modes of thought, tasks requiring 
either one mode, or the other, or shifting between them in a precisely orchestrated sequence 
the fruits of one mode become ingredients for the other. This resulted in the forging of a 
richly integrated creative internal network of understandings about the world and one’s place 
in it, or worldview, which we claim made BM possible. Thus, the notion that diffuse memory 
activation is conducive to associative thought while activation of a narrow receptive field is 
conducive to analytic thought is not only consistent with the architecture of associative 
memory, but suggests an underlying mechanism by which CF enabled the ability to both (1) 
stay task-focused, and (2) deviate from the task to make new connections, as needed. In this 
view, language did not evolve solely to help people communicate and collaborate (thereby 
accelerating the pace of cultural innovation); it also helped people think ideas through for 
themselves and manipulate them in a deliberate, controlled manner. Language facilitated the 
weaving of experiences into stories, parables, and broader conceptual frameworks, thereby 
integrating knowledge and experience (see also, Gabora & Aerts, 2009). Instead of staying 
squarely in the narrow regime between order and chaos, thought could now shift between 
orderly and chaotic, as appropriate. 
Thus, we propose that the emergence of a self-organizing worldview required two 
transitions. The onset of STR over 2 mya allowed rehearsal and refinement of skills and made 
possible minor modifications of representations. The onset of CF approximately 100,000 
years ago made it possible to forge larger bridges through conceptual space that paved the 
way for innovations specifically tailored to selective pressures. It enabled a cultural version of 
what Gould and Vrba (1982) call exaptation, wherein an existing trait is co-opted for a new 
function (Gabora, Scott, & Kauffman, 2013). Exaptation of representations and ideas vastly 
enhanced the ability to expand the technological and social spheres of life, as well as to 
develop individualized perspectives conducive to fulfilling complementary social roles. This 
increase in cognitive variation provided the raw material for enhanced cultural adaptation to 
selective pressures. 
 
Comparison with Other Theories 
Our proposal is superficially similar to (and predates – see Gabora 2003) the suggestion that 
what distinguishes human cognition from that of other species is our capacity for dual 
processing (Evans, 2008; Nosek, 2007). This is the hypothesis that humans engage in (1) a 
primitive implicit Type 1 mode involving free association and fast ‘gut responses’, but (2) an 
explicit Type 2 mode involving deliberate analysis. However, while dual processing makes 
the split between older, more automatic processes and newer, more deliberate processes, CF 
makes the split between an older associative mode based on relationships of correlation and a 
newer analytic mode based on relationships of causation. We propose that although earlier 
hominids relied on the older association-based system, because their memories were coarser-
grained, there were fewer routes for meaningful associations, so there was less associative 
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processing of previous experiences. Therefore, items encoded in memory tended to remain in 
the same form as when they were originally assimilated; rather than engaging in associative or 
analytic processing of previously assimilated material, there was greater tendency to leave 
mental contents in their original form and instead focus on the present. Thus, while dual 
processing theory attributes abstract, hypothetical thinking to the more recent Type 2 mode, 
according to our theory abstract thought is possible in either mode but differs in character in 
the two modes: logically constructed arguments in the analytic mode versus flights of fancy in 
the associative mode. Our theory is rooted in a distinction in the creativity literature between 
(1) associative divergent processes said to predominate during idea generation, and (2) 
analytic convergent processes said to predominate during the refinement and testing of an idea 
(Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; see also Sowden, Pringle, & Gabora [2014], for a comparison 
of theories of creativity; and Gabora, 2018 for the distinction between associative versus 
divergent thought). 
Mithen (1996) proposed that BM came about through the integration of previously-
compartmentalized intelligence modules that were specialized for natural history, technology, 
socialization and language. This integration, he says, enabled cognitive fluidity: the capacity 
to combine concepts and adapt ideas to new contexts, and thereby explore, map, and 
transform conceptual spaces across different knowledge systems. A related proposal 
emphasizes the benefit of cognitive fluidity for the capacity to make and understand analogies 
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2002). Our explanation is consistent with these but goes beyond them 
by showing how conceptual fluidity would arise naturally as a function of the capacity to, 
when appropriate, shift to a more associative processing mode. 
There are many versions of the theory that BM reflects the onset of complex language 
complete with recursive embedding of syntactic structure (Bickerton & Szathmáry, 2009; 
Carstairs-McCarthy, 1999), which enabled symbolic representation and abstract thought 
(Bickerton, 2014; Deacon, 1997), narrative myth (Donald, 1991), enhanced communication, 
cooperation, and group identity (Voorhees, Read & Gabora, in press). Our proposal is 
consistent with the view that complex language lay at the heart of BM, but because STR 
followed by CF would have enabled hominids to not just recursively refine and modify 
thoughts but consider them from different perspectives at different hierarchical levels, it set 
the stage for complex language. 
Since, as explained above, we see evidence of recursive reasoning well before BM, 
our framework is inconsistent with the hypothesis that onset of recursive thought enabled 
mental time travel, distinctly-human cognition, and BM (Corballis, 2011; see also Suddendorf 
et al., 2009). Nevertheless, we suggest that the ability to shift between different modes of 
thought using CF would have brought on the capacity to make vastly better use of it. The 
proposal that BM arose due to onset of the capacity to model the contents of other minds, 
sometimes referred to as ‘Theory of Mind’ (Tomasello, 2014) is somewhat underwritten by 
recursion, since the mechanism that allows for recursion is required for modeling the contents 
of other minds (though in this case the emphasis is on the social impact of recursion, rather 
than the capacity for recursion itself). Our proposal is also consistent with explanations for 
BM that emphasize social-ecological factors (Foley & Gamble, 2009; Whiten, 2011), but 
places these explanations in a broader framework by suggesting a mechanism that aided not 
just social skills but other skills (e.g., technological) as well. While most of these explanations 
are correct insofar as they go, we suggest that they do not get to the root of the matter. As Carl 
Woese wrote of science at large “...sometimes [there is] no single best representation... only 
deeper understanding, more revealing and enveloping representations,” (2004, page 173). We 
propose that the second cognitive transition necessary for cumulative, adaptive, open-ended 
cultural evolution was the onset of CF, because once hominids could adapt their mode of 
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thought to their situation by reflecting on mental contents through the lenses of different 
perspectives, at different levels of analysis, their initially fragmented mental models of their 
world could be integrated into more coherent representations of their world—i.e., worldviews. 
This facilitated not just survival skills, conceptual fluidity, and creative problem-solving, but 
also social exchange and the emergence of complex social structures.  
In short, the explanation proposed here is the only one we know of that grew out of a 
synthesis of archaeological and anthropological data with theories and research from both 
psychology and neuroscience, and it appears to underwrite explanations having specifically to 
do with dual processing, conceptual fluidity, language, social interaction, or theory of mind. 
 
A Tentative Genetic Basis for Contextual Focus 
The hypothesis that BM arose due to the onset of contextual focus (CF, or the capacity to shift 
between different modes of thought), leads to the question: what caused CF? In this section 
we explore a possible genetic basis for CF. First, we provide historical context by reviewing 
both studies that implicated genes such as FOXP2 in the origins of language, and the evidence 
that caused this explanation to fall out of favor. Next, we review anthropological and 
archaeological evidence that the coming into prominence of creative and cognitive abilities 
(including but not limited to those that involve language) coincides with the evolutionary 
origins of FOXP2. Then we synthesize these literatures in a new explanation of the role of 
FOXP2 in language and cognition. 
FOXP2, a transcription gene on chromosome 7 (Reimers-Kipping, Hevers, Paabo, & 
Enard 2011), regulates the activity of other genes involved in the development and function of 
the brain (Fisher & Ridley 2013; Kovas & Plomin 2006). Among other functions, FOXP2 
plays a role in the functioning of the motor cortex, the striatum, and the cerebellum, which 
controls fine motor skills (Liegeois, Morgan, Connelly, & Vargha-Khadem 2011). There are 
findings of familial resemblance for specific components of linguistic competence and 
suggestions of a genetic basis for such competences (e.g., Kovac, Gopnik, & Palmour 2002). 
The finding that a mutation in FOXP2 was associated with language comprehension 
and production in a family known as the KE Family (Lai, Fisher, Hurst, Vargha-Khadem, & 
Monaco 2001) led to the proposal that the gene plays a key role in language acquisition. The 
family was diagnosed with Specific Language Impairment (SLI), a severe deficit in language 
development that exists despite adequate educational opportunity and normal nonverbal 
intelligence (Lai et al. 2001; Morgan 2013). Those afflicted with SLI exhibit deficits in 
speech comprehension as well as verbal dyspraxia – a severe difficulty controlling the 
movement and sequencing of orofacial muscles required for the articulation of fluent speech 
(Lalmansingh, Karmakar, Jin, & Nagaich, 2012). Thus FOXP2 became prematurely known as 
the “language gene” (Bickerton, 2014). 
Evidence that FOXP2 is actively transcribed in brain areas where mirror neurons are 
present suggested that FOXP2 makes language possible at least partially through its effect on 
the capacity to imitate (Corballis, 2004). This hypothesis was strengthened by findings that 
mirror neurons play a key role in language development (Arbib, 2011). However, in order to 
imitate the language of others there must already be others using language. Therefore, it is 
difficult to fully account for the origin of language by positing that FOXP2 affects language 
by way of its effect on imitation. Moreover, this cannot explain the existence of defects 
associated with FOXP2 that involve neither language nor imitation. Finally, other species 
imitate but do not exhibit grammatical, syntactically rich language. 
The recognition that FOXP2 was not the “language gene” generated sober discussion 
about the simplicity of single gene explanations for complex traits. Indeed, as a transcription 
gene, FOXP2 only has an indirect effect on neural structure or behavior (Reimers-Kipping et 
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al. 2011). Evidence that FOXP2 affects abilities other than language, such as cognitive 
fluidity, and even IQ (Kurt, Fisher, & Ehret 2012; Lai et al. 2001), and plays a broad role in 
the modulation of neural plasticity (Fisher & Scharff 2009), suggest that the neurological 
basis of FOXP2 deficits lie in the structural and functional abnormalities of cortico-striatal 
and cortico-cerebellar circuitries, which are important for learning, memory, and motor 
control, not language exclusively. The structure of language is now widely believed to have 
come about through ontogenetic human learning and processing mechanisms (Christiansen & 
Chater 2008), with diversity of linguistic organization the rule rather than the exception, and 
instances of universality reflecting stable engineering solutions satisfying multiple design 
constraints rather than natural selection (Evans & Levinson 2009). 
Language capacity is now widely thought to be polygenic, i.e., affected by multiple 
genes (Chabris et al., 2012; Kovas & Plomin, 2006), transcription genes such as FOXP2 are 
often pleiotropic, i.e., affecting multiple traits. It has been firmly established that a small 
perturbation (such as a mutation) can percolate through a system resulting in widespread, 
large-scale change, a phenomenon known as self-organized criticality (Bak, Tang, & 
Wiesenfeld, 1987), and self-organized criticality is particularly widespread in regulatory 
genes (Kauffman, 1993). Thus, the possibility that FOXP2 plays a role in cognition that 
extends beyond language is worthy of consideration. 
While it is clear that FOXP2 is important to language capacity in modern human 
populations, a recent re-examination of the gene in a large, global, sample concludes that 
there is “no evidence that the original two amino acid substitutions were targeted by a recent 
sweep limited to modern humans <200 kya...[and furthermore] recent natural selection in the 
ancestral Homo sapiens population cannot be attributed to the FOXP2 locus and thus Homo 
sapiens’ development of spoken language” (Atkinson et al. 2018, page 9). However, as noted 
above, FOXP2 is only one of one of several genes strongly implicated in conditioning 
language capacity; Mozzi et al. (2016) indicate that nine other genes are found, in various 
states, to compromise skills listed as language, reading, and speech, thus effecting both 
cognition (language and reading) and motor control (speech). Furthermore, the evolutionary 
history of these genes is under investigation, and promises to enrich our understanding of the 
evolution of the cognition responsible for language and, by extension, behavioral modernity. 
Given the evidence that FOXP2 plays a role in the evolution of complex cognitive 
abilities including language, but this relationship is not solely mediated through its effects on 
the capacity for imitation, it seems reasonable to propose that FOXP2 and/or other, associated 
genes or transcription factors enabled CF. Interestingly, the appearance of anatomically 
modern humans in the fossil record as early as 200,000 years ago coincides with accelerated 
FOXP2 evolution (Corballis 2004b; Lai et al. 2001). It has been proposed that the appearance 
of anatomically modern humans was due to amino acid substitutions that differentiate the 
human FOXP2 gene from that of chimpanzees (Enard et al. 2002; Zhang et al. 2002). Despite 
new challenges to the evolutionary history of FOXP2 (see discussion above) the 
preponderance of evidence currently suggest that within the last 200,000 years FOXP2 
underwent at least two human-specific mutations, at least one of which occurred within the 
last 100,000 years (Lai et al. 2001; Morgan 2013). This chronologically aligns modifications 
of FOXP2 with the onset of not just anatomical modernity but also BM. Hence we propose 
that the Paleolithic transition to BM reflects a mutation to FOXP2 and/or its molecular 
associates that facilitated fine-tuning of the capacity to spontaneously shift between 
associative and analytic modes (CF) depending on the situation by varying the specificity of 
the activated memory region. 
We propose that the kickoff point for the explosion of creativity and onset of language 
in the Middle/Upper Paleolithic was human-specific amino acid substitutions to FOXP2 
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and/or its associates changed modifications of basal ganglia neurons that contribute to 
cognitive flexibility. These neurons have longer dendrite length and greater synaptic plasticity 
in humans compared to chimpanzees. These changes enhanced the efficiency of neural 
cortico-basal ganglia circuits, enabling individuals to spontaneously adjust to what extent the 
details of a given item in memory contributed to the flow of thought. For example, if not just 
the salient or defining aspects of a particular representation are activated but also peripheral 
aspects, then these peripheral features could trigger remote associations, thereby increasing 
conceptual fluidity. Our theory is consistent with the proposal that mutations in FOXP2 
and/or its associates underwrote the capacity for both the gestures and grammars associated 
with BM (see Vicario 2013). 
In short, we suggest that while FOXP2 is not the language gene it may have a broad 
and identifiable influence on cognition by enabling the capacity for CF. This is not 
incompatible with Crow’s (2012) proposal that the Protocadherin11XY gene pair played a 
key role in establishing cerebral asymmetry and enabling complex language. However, our 
proposal is compatible with evidence that FOXP2 and related genes paved the way for not just 
language but other features of BM as well. By tuning the mode of thought to match the needs 
of the present moment, CF allowed information to be processed at different degrees of 
granularity, and from different perspectives. Thus it is by way of CF that hominins became 
able to combine actions and words into an infinite variety of cultural outputs, and respond to 
changing selective pressures. Individuals could engage in convergent thought for well-defined 
tasks, but shift to divergent thought when they were stuck, or when they wanted to express 
themselves or explore aesthetic possibilities. This enabled them to connect ideas in new ways, 
resulting in advanced tools, elaborate burials, and different forms of creative expression, 
including art and jewelry. 
 
Discussion 
This chapter outlined a theory of how the the uniquely human capacity for collectively 
generated, open-ended, adaptive cultural evolution could have come about. Although change 
occurred in a mosaic fashion in the Homo lineage over more than two million years, two 
significant evolutionary transitions stand out. Thus, we propose that the distinctive rich 
symbolism and grammatically complex language of the genus Homo reflect two evolutionary 
transitions brought about by novel forms of cognitive information processing. 
First, the larger brain of H. erectus resulted in finer grained memory with detailed 
representations, paving the way for rehearsal of actions, refinement of skills, novel 
associations between closely related items in memory. This enabled STR, escape from 
episodic proximity, representational redescription, minor improvements in cultural outputs, 
and a “cultural ratcheting” that expanded the capacity for open-ended cultural evolution.  
The second transition occurred approximately 100,000 BP, a period associated with 
the origins of art, science and religion (Mithen, 1998). We suggest that newly-evolved basal 
ganglia circuits enabled onset of contextual focus: the ability to shift between convergent and 
divergent modes of thought, enabling hominins to process information from different 
perspectives and at multiple levels of detail. Hominins could now put their own spin on the 
ideas of others, adapting them to individual needs and tastes, leading to cumulative 
innovation. Thoughts, impressions, and attitudes could be modified by thinking about them in 
the context of each other, and they could be woven into an integrated “worldview” that 
defines who we are in relation to the world. This allowed the capacity for self-expression, 
creating an environment conducive to the emergence of complex language, including 
grammar, recursion, word inflections, and syntactical structure, as well as comprehension.  
This theory is consistent with findings that FOXP2 is associated with cognitive 
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abilities that do not involve language, and with findings that non-language creative abilities 
arose at approximately the same time as complex language (Chrusch & Gabora, 2014). It is 
also consistent with findings that despite the existence of sophisticated cognitive abilities in 
other species such as birds (Emery, 2016), we alone exhibit cumulative cultural evolution. 
Cumulative cultural evolution may involve the ‘recycling’ of cortical maps such that cultural 
innovations invade evolutionarily older brain circuits and inherit some of their structural 
constraints (Dehaene, 2005; Lieberman, 2016).  
 Elsewhere we provide support for the proposed two-transition scenario obtained using 
an agent-based model of cultural evolution (Gabora & Smith 2018). We note that the origins 
of BM are currently being rethought in light of wide dissatisfaction with an archaic ‘trait-list’ 
approach to its understanding (Ames, Riel-Salvatore, & Collins, 2013) and with nonlinear 
models of multifaceted cultural evolutionary change (Mesoudi, 2009; McDowell, 2013). The 
transitions to possession of the cognitive capacities that we propose made BM possible—STR 
and CF—exhibit Wilson’s (2010) defining characteristics of evolutionary transitions, i.e., they 
are rare, incomplete (did not ‘throw a switch’ resulting in immediate ‘turning on’ of BM), and 
involved new levels of organization. The increased sociality implied by the onset of STR and 
CF also meets Wilson’s expectation that evolutionary transitions drive “the suppression of 
fitness differences within groups, causing between-group selection to become the primary 
evolutionary force” (Wilson, 2010:135). It is our hope that the proposed theory of cognitive 
evolution reflects an emerging ‘Extended Evolutionary Synthesis’ (Smith & Ruppell, 2011, 
Smith, Gabora, & Gardner-O’Kearny in press; Woese, 2004). We suggest that the origins of 
BM be considered an evolutionary transition that culminated in new varieties of information 
both within the mind and in artificial memory systems external to it, giving way to new social 
arrangements and paving the way for the complex cultural systems in which we are presently 
immersed. 
 
Acknowledgments 
This work was supported by a grant (62R06523) to the first author from the Natural Sciences 
and Engineering Research Council of Canada. 
 
References 
Agnoli, S., Franchin, L., Rubaltelli, E., & Corazza, G. E., (2015). An eye-tracking analysis of 
irrelevance processing as moderator of openness and creative performance. Creativity 
Research Journal, 27, 125-132. doi:10.1080/10400419.2015.1030304 
Aiello, L. (1996). Hominin pre-adaptations for language and cognition. In Mellars P., & 
Gibson K. (eds): Modeling the early human mind, pp. 89-99. McDonald Institute 
Monographs, Cambridge. 
Ames C., Riel-Salvatore J., & Collins B. (2013). Why we need an alternative approach to the 
study of modern human behaviour. Canadian Journal Archaeology, 37(1), 21-47. 
Arbib M. (2011). From mirror neurons to complex imitation in the evolution of language and 
tool-use. Annual Review Anthropology, 40, 257-273. doi:10.1146/annurev-anthro-
081309-145722 
Atkinson, E. G., Amanda, J. A., Palacios, Bobo D. M., Webb A. E., & Ramachandran S. 
Henn, B. M. (2018). No evidence for recent selection at FOXP2 among diverse human 
populations. Cell, 174, 1-12. doi:10.1016/j.cell.2018.06.048 
Bak P., Tang C., & Weisenfeld K. (1987). Self-organized criticality. Physical Reiew A., 38, 
364 DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.38.364  
Barsalou L.W. (2005). Abstraction as dynamic interpretation in perceptual symbol systems. In 
Gershkoff-Stowe L. & Rakison D. (eds): Building object categories (pp. 389-431). 
14 PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS TRANSITIONS ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD 
  
Earlbaum, Carnegie Symposium Series. 
Bickerton D. (2014). More than nature needs: Language, mind and evolution. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Bickerton D., & Szathmáry E. 2009. Biological foundations and origin of syntax. MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
Blackwell L. & d’Errico F. 2001. Evidence of termite foraging by Swartkrans early Hominins. 
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 98(4), 1358-1363 https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.98.4.1358 
Braun D., Plummer T., Ditchfield P., Ferraro J., Maina D., Bishop L. & Potts R. (2008). 
Oldowan behavior and raw material transport: Perspectives from the Kanjera 
Formation. Journal of  Archaeology Science, 35, 2329-2345. 
Bruner E. (2010). The evolution of the parietal cortical areas in the human genus; between 
structure and cognition. In Broadfield, D., M. Yuan, K. Schick & N. Toth (eds) The 
Human Brain Evolving: Paleoneurological Studies in Honor of Ralph L. Holloway, pp. 
83-96. Stone Age Institute Press, Gosport, Indiana. 
Byrne R. & Russon A. 1998. Learning by imitation: A hierarchical approach. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 2, 667-721. 
Calcott B. & Sterelny K. (2011). The major transitions in evolution revisited. Vienna Series 
Theor. Biol.. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Call J. & Tomasello M. (2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(5), 187-192. 
Chabris C., Hebert B., Benjamin D., Beauchamp J., Cesarini D., van der Loos M., 
Johannesson M., Magnusson P., Lichtenstein P., Atwood C., Freese J., Hauser T., 
Hauser R., Christakis N., & Laibson D. (2012). Most reported genetic associations with 
general intelligence are probably false positives. Psychology  Science, 23(11), 1314-
1323. 
Christiansen M., & Chater N. (2008). Language as shaped by the brain. Behav. Brain Sci., 31, 
489-558. doi:10.1017/S0140525X08004998 
Christiansen M., & Kirby S. (2003). Language evolution: Consensus and controversies. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 300-307. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00136-0 
Chrusch C. & Gabora L. (2014). A tentative role for FOXP2 in the evolution of dual 
processing modes and generative abilities. Proc. 36th Ann. Mtng. Cogn. Sci. Soc. 
(pp.499-504). Cognitive Science Society, Austin. 
Chomsky, N. (2008). On Phases. In Freidlin, R., C.P. Otero and M.L. Subizarreta (eds) 
Foundational Issues in Linguistic Theory: Essays in honor of Jean-Roger Vergnaud, 
pp.133-166.  
Corballis M. C. (2004). The origins of modernity: Was autonomous speech the critical factor? 
Psychological Review, 111(2), 543-552. 
Corballis M., (2011). The recursive mind: The origins of human language, thought, and 
civilization. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Cornish-Bowden A, & Cárdenas M. L. (2017). Life before LUCA. Journal Theoretical 
Biology, 434, 68–74. doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.05.023 
Cosmides L., & Tooby J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In Barkow, J.H., 
Cosmides L., & Tooby J. (eds): The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the 
generation of culture, pp. 163-228. Oxford University Press, USA.  
Crow T. (2012). Schizophrenia as variation in the sapiens-specific epigenetic instruction to 
the embryo. Clinical Genetics., 81, 319-324. doi:10.1111/j.1399-0004.2012.01830.x 
Davidson I. & Noble W. (1989). The archaeology of perception: Traces of depiction and 
language. Current Anthropology, 30, 125-155. doi:10.1086/203723 
Deacon T. (1997). The symbolic species: The Coevolution of Language and the Brain. 
15 PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS TRANSITIONS ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD 
  
Norton, New York. 
Dehaene S. (2005). Evolution of human cortical circuits for reading and arithmetic: The 
“neuronal recycling" hypothesis. In Dehaene S., Duhamel J., Hauser M. & Rozzolatto 
G. (eds): From monkey brain to human brain, pp.133-157. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
D’Errico F., Henshilwood C., Lawson G., Canhaeren M., Tillier A., Soressi M., . . . Julien M. 
(2003). Archaeological evidence for the emergence of language, symbolism and music: 
An alternative multidisciplinary perspective. Journal World Prehistory, 17, 1-70. 
dio:10.1023/A:1023980201043 
D’Errico F., Vanhaeren M. & van Niekerk K. (2005). Nassarius kraussianus shell beads from 
Blombos Cave: evidence for symbolic behavior in the Middle Stone Age. Journal of 
Human Evolution, 48, 3-24. doi:10.1016/j.jhevol.2004.09.002 
D’Errico F., Bartond N., Bouzouggar A., Mienis H., Richter D., . . . Lozouet P. (2009). 
Additional evidence on the use of personal ornaments in the middle paleolithic of north 
africa. Proceedings of the National Academy Sciences, 106, 16051-16056. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0903532106 
DeLong J.P., Okie J., Moses M,. Silby R. & Brown J. (2010). Shifts in metabolic scaling, 
production, and efficiency across major evolutionary transitions of life. Proceedings of 
the National Academy Sciences, 107, 12941-12945. doi:10.1072/pnas.1007783107 
Donald M. (1991). Origins of the modern mind: Three stages in the evolution of culture and 
cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Dunbar R. (1993). Coevolution of neocortical size, group size, and language in humans. 
Behavorial Brain Science, 16(4), 681-735 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00032325 
Enard W., Przeworski M., Fisher S., Lai C., Weibe V. & Kitano T. (2002). Molecular 
evolution of FOXP2, a gene involved in speech and language. Nature, 418: 869-872. 
Erlandson J. M. (2001). The archaeology of aquatic adaptations: Paradigms for a new 
millennium. Journal of Archaeological Research, 9, 287-350. 
doi:10.1023/A:1013062712695 
Evans J. (2008). Dual-process accounts of reasoning, judgment and social cognition. Annual 
Review Psychology, 59, 255-278. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 
Fauconnier G. & Turner M. 2002. The way we think: Conceptual blending and the mind’s 
hidden complexities. Basic Books, New York. 
Chan, J., & Schunn, C. (2015). The impact of analogies on creative concept generation: 
Lessons from an in vivo study in engineering design. Cognitive Science 39, 126-155. 
doi:10.1111/cogs.12127  
Feinstein, J.S. 2006. The nature of creative development. Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
Finke R., Ward T. & Smith S. 1992. Creative cognition: Theory, research, and applications. 
MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Fisher S. & Ridley M. 2013. Culture, genes, and the human revolution. Science, 340, 929-930. 
doi:10.1126/science.1236171 
Fisher S. & Scharff C. (2009). FOXP2 as a molecular window into speech and language. 
Trends Genet., 25, 166-177. doi:10.1016/j.tig.2009.03.002 
Foley R. & Gamble C. (2009). The ecology of social transitions in human evolution. 
Philosophical Transactions of the. Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 364, 3267-
3279. doi:10.1098/rstb.2009.0136  
Fuentes A. (2015). Evolution of human behavior. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Finke R., Ward T. & Smith S. (1992). Creative Cognition: Theory, Research, and 
Applications. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Gabora, L. (1998). Weaving, bending, patching, mending the fabric of reality: A cognitive 
science perspective on worldview inconsistency. Foundations of Science 3(2), 395-428. 
16 PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS TRANSITIONS ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD 
  
Gabora, L. (2000). Conceptual closure: how memories are woven into an interconnected 
worldview. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 901, 1, 42-53. 
Gabora L. (2002). Cognitive mechanisms underlying the creative process. In Proceedings of 
the 4th conference on creativity & cognition, pp. 126-133. Association for Computing 
Machinery, New York. 
Gabora L. (2003). Contextual focus: A cognitive explanation for the cultural transition of the 
Middle/Upper Paleolithic. Proc. Ann. Conf. Cogn. Sci. Soc., pp.432-437. Lawrence 
Erlbaum, Mahwah NJ. 
Gabora L. (2006). Self-other organization: Why early life did not evolve through natural 
selection. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 241, 441–450. 
Gabora L. (2010). Revenge of the ’neurds’: Characterizing creative thought in terms of the 
structure and dynamics of human memory. Creativity Research Journal, 22, 1-13. 
doi:10.1080/10400410903579494 
Gabora L. (2013). An evolutionary framework for cultural change: Selectionism versus 
communal exchange. Physics of Life Reviews, 10(2), 117-145. 
Gabora L. (2017). Honing theory: A complex systems framework for creativity. Nonlinear 
Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences, 21(1), 35-88. 
Gabora L. (2018). The neural basis and evolution of divergent and convergent thought. In 
Vartanian O. & Jung R. (eds): The Cambridge handbook of the neuroscience of 
creativity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Gabora, L. (in press.) Creativity: Linchpin in the quest for a viable theory of cultural 
evolution. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences. 
 Gabora L. & Aerts D. (2009). A mathematical model of the emergence of an integrated 
worldview. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 53, 434-451. 
doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2009.06.004 
Gabora L., & Ranjan A. (2013). How insight emerges in distributed, content-addressable 
memory. In A. Bristol, O. Vartanian, & J. Kaufman (Eds.) The neuroscience of 
creativity, pp. 19-43. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Gabora, L., E.O. Scott and S. Kauffman. (2013). A quantum model of exaptation: 
Incorporating potentiality into evolutionary theory. Progress in Biophysics and 
Molecular Biology 113, 108-116. 
Gabora, L. & Steel, M. (2017). Autocatalytic networks in cognition and the origin of culture. 
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 431, 87-95. 
Gabora, L. & Smith, C.M. (2018). Two cognitive transitions underlying the capacity for 
cultural evolution. Journal of Anthropological Sciences 96, 1-26. Doi: 
10.4436/jass.96008 
Geels F. (2002). Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: a multi-
level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy, 31, 1257-1274. doi:10.1016/S0048-
7333(02)00062-8 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2011). Darwinian populations and transitions in individuality. In Calcott 
B. & Sterelny K. (eds): The major evolutionary transitions revisited. Vienna series in 
theoretical biology, pp. 65-81. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Goldenfeld, N., Biancalani, T., Jafarpour, F., (2017). Universal biology and the statistical 
mechanics of early life. Philosophical Transactions. Series A, Mathematical, Physical, 
and Engineering Sciences, 375(2109), 20160341-20160341. doi:10.1098/rsta.2016.0341 
Goren-Inbar N., Alperson N., Kiselv M., Simchoni O., Melamed Y., Ben-Nun, A.. & Werker, 
E. (2004). Evidence of Hominin control of fire at Gesher Benot Ya‚Äôaqov, Israel. 
Science, 304, 725-727. doi:10.1126/science.1095443 
Gould, S. & E. Vrba. (1982). Exaptation—a Missing Term in the Science of Form. 
17 PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS TRANSITIONS ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD 
  
Palaeobiology 8(1), 4-15. 
Haidle M. (2009). How to think a simple spear. In S.A. deBaune, F.L. Coolidge & T. Wynn 
(eds): Cognitive archaeology and human evolution, pp.57-73. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Harmand S., Lewis J., Feibel C., Lepre C., Prat S., Lenoble A., . . . & Roche, H. (2015). 3.3-
million-year-old stone tools from Lomekwi 3, West Turkana, Kenya. Nature, 521, 310-
315. doi:10.1038/nature14464 
Hauser, M., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it 
and how did it evolve? Science, 298, 1569-1579. doi:10.1126/science.298.5598.1569 
Henrich J. & Boyd R. (2002). On modeling cognition and culture: Why replicators are not 
necessary for cultural evolution. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2: 87-112. 
https://doi.org/10.1163/156853702320281836  
Hovers, E., Lani S., Bar-Yosef, O., & Vandermeersch, B. (2003). An early case of color 
symbolism: Ochre use by modern humans in Qafzeh Cave. Current Anthropology, 44, 
491-522. doi:10.1086/375869   
Kauffman S. (1993). Origins of Order. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Klein, S., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., & Chance, S. (2002). Decisions and the evolution of 
memory: Multiple systems, multiple functions. Psychological. Review, 109, 306-329. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.109.2.306 
Kovas, Y. & Polmin, R. (2006). Generalist genes: implications for the cognitive sciences. 
Trends of Cognitive Science, 10, 198-203. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.03.001 
Kovac, I., Gopnik M. & Palmour R. (2002). Sibling resemblance for specific components of 
linguistic competence in families of speech/language impaired children. Journal of 
Neurolinguistics, 15, 497-513. 
Kurt, S., Fisher, S., & Ehret, G. (2012). FOXP2 mutations impair auditory-motor association 
learning. PloS One, 7, 1-5. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033130 
Lai C., Fisher S., Hurst J., Vargha-Khadem, F., & Monaco, A. (2001). A forkhead-domain 
gene is mutated in a severe speech and language disorder. Nature, 413, 519-523. 
doi:10.1038/35097076 
Lalmansingh, A., Karmakar, S., Jin, Y., & Nagaich, A. K. (2012). Multiple modes of 
chromatin remodeling by forkhead box proteins. BBA - Gene Regulatory Mechanisms, 
1819(7), 707-715. doi:10.1016/j.bbagrm.2012.02.018 
Leaf, M. & Read, D. (2012). Human thought and social organization: Archaeology on a new 
plane. Lexington Publishers, Guilford, CT. 
Lepre, C. J., Roche, H., Kent, D. V., Harmand, S., Quinn, R. L., Brugal, J., . . . Feibel, C. S. 
(2011). An earlier origin for the acheulian. Nature, 477(7362), 82-85. doi: 
10.1038/nature10372 
Lieberman, P. (2016). The evolution of language and thought. Journal of Anthropological 
Sciences, 94, 127-146. 
Liegeois, F., Morgan, A.T., A. Connelly, and F. Vargha-Khadem. Endophenotypes of 
FOXP2: dysfunction within the human articulatory network. European Journal of 
Paediatric Neurology 15(4), 283-288. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpn.2011.04.006 
Mania, D. & Mania, U. (2005). The natural and socio-cultural environment of Homo erectus 
at Bilzingsleben, Germany. In Gamble C. (ed): The individual Hominid in context: 
Archaeological investigations of Lower and Middle Palaeolithic landscapes, locales, 
and artifacts (pp. 98-114). Psychology Press, Hove, UK. 
McBrearty, S., & Brooks, A. (2000). The revolution that wasn’t: A new interpretation of the 
origin of modern human behavior. Journal of Human Evolution, 39, 453-563. 
doi:10.1006/jhev.2000.0435 
18 PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS TRANSITIONS ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD 
  
McDowell, J. J. (2013). A quantitative evolutionary theory of adaptive behavior dynamics. 
Psychological Review, 120(4), 731-750. doi:10.1037/a0034244 
Mesoudi, A. (2009). How cultural evolutionary theory can inform social psychology and vice 
versa.Psychological Review, 116, 929-952. doi:10.1037/a0017062 
Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A., & Laland, K. N. (2006). Towards a unified science of cultural 
evolution. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29(4), 329-347. 
doi:10.1017/S0140525X06009083 
Mithen S. (1996). The Prehistory of the Mind: The Cognitive Origins of Art, Religion and 
Science. Thames and Hudson Press, London. 
Mellars P. (2006). Going East: New genetic and archaeological perspectives on the modern 
human colonization of Eurasia. Science, 313, 796-800. doi:10.1126/science.1128402 
Morgan A. 2013. Speech-language pathology insights into genetics and neuroscience: Beyond 
surface behaviour. International  Journal of  Speech-Language Pathology, 15, 245-254. 
doi:10.3109/17549507.2013.777786 
Moutsou T. 2014. The Obsidian Evidence for the Scale of Social Life During the Palaeolithic. 
British Archaeological Reports, Oxford. 
Mozzi, A., D. Forni, M. Clerici, U. Pozzoli, S. Mascheretti, F.R. Guerini, S. Riva, N. 
Bresolin, R. agliani and M. Sironi.2016. The evolutionary history of genes involved in 
spoken and written language: beyond FOXP2.Nature Scientific Reports 6, Article 
number: 22157 (2016). DOI https://www.nature.com/articles/srep22157. 
Mulvaney, J. & Kamminga, J. (1999). Prehistory of Australia. Smithsonian Institution 
Scholarly Press, Washington. 
Nosek, B. A. (2007). Implicit-explicit relations. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 16(2), 65-69. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00477.x 
Otte, M. (2012). The management of space during the paleolithic. Quaternary 
International, 247, 212-229. doi:10.1016/j.quaint.2010.11.031 
Penn, D. C., Holyoak, K. J., & Povinelli, D. J. (2008) Darwin's mistake: Explaining the 
discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
31(2), 109-178. 
Pike A., Hoffmann D., García-Diez M., Pettitt P., Alcolea J., De Balbin R. & Zilhão J. 2012. 
U-series dating of Paleolithic art in 11 caves in Spain. Science, 336, 1409-1413. 
A. W. G. Pike, Hoffmann, D. L., García-Diez, M., Pettitt, P. B., Alcolea, J., Balbín, R. D., . . . 
Zilhão, J. (2012). U-series dating of paleolithic art in 11 caves in spain. Science, 336, 
1409-1413. doi:10.1126/science.1219957 
Plummer T. 2004. Flaked stones and old bones: Biological and cultural evolution at the dawn 
of technology. Yearbook Physical Anthropol., 47: 118-164 
.https://doi.org/10.1002/ajpa.20157  
Potts, R. (2012). Environmental and behavioral evidence pertaining to the evolution of early 
homo.Current Anthropology, 53, S299-S317. doi:10.1086/667704 
Parfitt, S.A., Ashton, N.M. Lewis, S.G., Abel, R.L., Coope, G.R., M.H. Field…&Stringer, 
C.B. (2010). Early pleistocene human occupation at the edge of the boreal zone in 
northwest europe. Nature, 466, 229-233. doi:10.1038/nature09117 
Rappaport R. (1999). Ritual and religion in the making of humanity. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Read, D. W. (2008). Working memory: A cognitive limit to non-human primate recursive 
thinking prior to hominid evolution. Evolutionary Psychology, 6(4), 147470490800600. 
doi:10.1177/147470490800600413 
Read, D., Lane, D., & van der Leeuw, S. (2009). The innovation innovation. In Lane D., 
Pumain D., van der Leeuw S.E. & West G. (eds). Complexity perspectives in innovation 
19 PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS TRANSITIONS ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD 
  
and social change (pp. 43-84). Springer, Netherlands. 
Read, D., & van der Leeuw, S. (2015). The extension of social relations in time and space 
during the Palaeolithic period and beyond. In Wenban-Smith, F. Coward, F., Hosfield 
R. & Pope M. (eds): Settlement, society and cognition in human evolution (pp. 31-53). 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Reimers-Kipping, S., Hevers, W., Pääbo, S., & Enard, W. (2011). Humanized Foxp2 
specifically affects cortico-basal ganglia circuits. Neuroscience, 175, 75-84. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2010.11.042 
Schultz, T. R., & Brady, S. G. (2008). Major evolutionary transitions in ant 
agriculture. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(14), 5435. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0711024105 
Sell, A., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., Sznycer, D., Rueden, C. v., & Gurven, M. (2009;2008;). 
Human adaptations for the visual assessment of strength and fighting ability from the 
body and face.Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 276(1656), 575. 
doi:10.1098/rspb.2008.1177 
Shea, J. (2011). Homo sapiens is as Homo sapiens was: Behavioral variability versus 
“behavioral modernity” in Paleolithic archaeology. Curr. Anthropol., 52, 1-35. 
Smith C.M. & Ruppell J. 2011. What anthropologists should know about the new 
evolutionary synthesis. Structure Dynamics, 5, 1-13. 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/18b9f0jb 
Smith C.M. 2013. Comment on ’An evolutionary framework for cultural change; 
Selectionism versus communal exchange’. Physics of Life Reviews 10: 156-157. doi: 
10.1016/j.plrev.2013.03.011. 
Smith, C.M., L. Gabora and W. Gardner-O’Kearny. In press. The extended evolutionary 
synthesis paves the way for an evolutionary model of culture change. Cliodynamics. 
Sowden, P. T., Pringle, A., & Gabora, L. (2015). The shifting sands of creative thinking: 
Connections to dual-process theory. Thinking & Reasoning, 21, 40-60. 
doi:10.1080/13546783.2014.885464 
Straus, L.G. (2009). Has the Notion of 'Transitions; in Paleolithic Prehistory Outlived its 
Usefulness? The European Record in Wider Context. Pages 3-18 in Camps, M. and 
Chauhan, P. (eds). 2009. Sourcebook of Paleolithic Transitions. New York, Springer. 
Suddendorf T., Addis D. & Corballis M. 2009. Mental time travel and the shaping of the 
human mind. Philos. T. R. Soc. B., 364, 317-24. 
Suddendorf, T., Addis, D. R., & Corballis, M. C. (2009). Mental time travel and the shaping 
of the human mind. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological 
Sciences, 364, 1317. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0301 
Szathmary, E., & Smith, J. (1995). The major evolutionary transitions. Nature, 374, 227-232. 
doi:10.1038/374227a0 
Szathmary E. 2015. Toward major evolutionary transitions theory 2.0. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci., 
112, 10104-10111. 
Tomasello, M.(1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Tomasello, M. (2014). A natural history of human thinking. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Vartanian, O. (2009). Variable attention facilitates creative problem solving. Psychology of 
Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 3, 57-59. doi:10.1037/a0014781 
Vetsigian, K., Woese, C.  & Goldenfeld, N.  (2006). Collective evolution and the genetic 
code. Proceedings of the National Academies of the United States of America USA, 103, 
10696–10701. 
20 PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS TRANSITIONS ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD 
  
Voorhees, B., Read, D., & Gabora, L. (in press). Identity, Kinship, and the evolution of 
cooperation. Current Anthropology. 
Vicario C. 2013. FOXP2 gene and language development: the molecular substrate of the 
gestural-origin theory of speech? Front. Behav. Neurosci., 7, 1-3. 
Vicario, C. M. (2013). FOXP2 gene and language development: The molecular substrate of 
the gestural-origin theory of speech? Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 7. 
doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00099 
Villmoare, B., Kimbel, W. H., Seyoum, C., Campisano, C. J., DiMaggio, E. N., Rowan, J., . . . 
Reed, K. E. (2015). Early homo at 2.8 ma from ledi-geraru, afar, ethiopia. Science, 347, 
1352-1355. doi:10.1126/science.aaa1343 
Wiessner, P. W. (2014). Embers of society: Firelight talk among the Ju/’hoansi 
bushmen. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111, 14027. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1404212111 
Whiten A. 2011. The scope of culture in chimpanzees, humans and ancestral apes. Philos. T. 
R. Soc. B, 366: 997-1007. 
Whiten, A. (2011). The scope of culture in chimpanzees, humans and ancestral apes. The 
Royal Society. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.033 
Wilson, D. (2010). Multilevel selection and major transitions. In Pigliucci M. & Miller G.B. 
(eds): Evolution: The extended synthesis, pp.81-93. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Woese, C. R. (2002). On the evolution of cells. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 99(13), 8742-8747. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.132266999 
Woese, C. R. (2004). A new biology for a new century. Microbiology and Molecular Biology 
Reviews, 68, 173-186. doi:10.1128/MMBR.68.2.173-186.2004 
Wragg-Sykes, R.M. (2015). To see a world in a hafted tool: birch pitch composite technology, 
cognition and memory in Neanderthals. In Wenban-Smith, F., Pope, M., Coward, F. and 
Hosfield, R. (eds) Settlement, society and cognition in human evolution: landscapes in 
mind, pp. 117-137. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. doi: 
10.1017/CBO9781139208697.008 
Wynn, T., Overmann, K.A., Coolidge, F.L. & Janulis, K. (2017). Bootstraping ordinal 
thinking. In Wynn, T. & Coolidge F.L. (eds): Cognitive models in Palaeolithic 
archaeology (pp. 197-213). Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Zhang, J., Webb, D. M., & Podlaha, O. (2002). Accelerated protein evolution and origins of 
human-specific features: FOXP2 as an example. Genetics, 162, 1825-1835. 
